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Abstract






and select a winner. Prior work designs simple tournament rules such that no pair of teams can
manipulate the outcome of their match to improve their probability of winning by more than 1/3,
and this is the best possible among any Condorcet-consistent tournament rule (which selects an
undefeated team whenever one exists) [14, 15]. These lower bounds require the manipulators to
know precisely the outcome of all future matches.
We take a beyond worst-case view and instead consider tournaments which are “close to uniform”:
the outcome of all matches are independent, and no team is believed to win any match with probability
exceeding 1/2 + ε. We show that Randomized Single Elimination Bracket [14] and a new tournament
rule we term Randomized Death Match have the property that no pair of teams can manipulate the
outcome of their match to improve their probability of winning by more than ε/3 + 2ε2/3, for all ε,
and this is the best possible among any Condorcet-consistent tournament rule.
Our main technical contribution is a recursive framework to analyze the manipulability of certain
forms of tournament rules. In addition to our main results, this view helps streamline previous
analysis of Randomized Single Elimination Bracket, and may be of independent interest.
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1 Introduction
A tournament consists of n teams competing to win a championship via pairwise matches,
and a tournament rule (possibly randomly) selects a single winner as a result of these matches.
Tournament rules have been studied within Social Choice Theory for decades [6, 12, 16, 3, 7,
10, 11], see also [4] for a survey, and have gained attention from a few angles within TCS
more recently [2, 1, 18, 17, 9, 8, 14, 15]. Our work follows the model studied in [2, 1, 14, 15]
and seeks to design tournaments which are both fair (in that they select a reasonable winner,
based on the match outcomes), and “as strategyproof as possible” subject to this.
More specifically, these works acknowledge that an undefeated team, if one exists, should
surely win any reasonable tournament format. Formally, this property is termed Condorcet-
consistent (Definition 4). These works also consider the possibility of two teams strategically
manipulating the match between them to improve the probability that one of them wins.
The situation to have in mind is that perhaps two teams sponsored by the same company
enter an eSports tournament, and wish to maximize the probability that either of them take
home the prize money. A rule is 2-Strongly Non-Manipulable (2-SNM, Definition 7) if no
pair of teams can manipulate it to improve the probability that one of them wins.
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Initial works quickly established that no tournament rule exists which is both Condorcet-
consistent and 2-SNM [2, 1]. More recent works study the extent to which tournament
rules can be Condorcet-consistent and approximately 2-SNM. Specifically, a rule is 2-SNM-α
if no pair of teams can improve the probability that one of them wins by more than α
(Definition 7). [14, 15] design simple Condorcet-consistent tournament rules (defined in
Section 3) which are 2-SNM-1/3, and also show this is the best possible worst-case guarantee.
1.1 Our Results: Probabilistic Tournaments
The lower bounds in previous works assume that the deterministic future outcome of all
matches is known at the time of manipulation. While this is certainly a plausible scenario,
most competitions worth watching have some element of uncertainty, even for matches
between strong and weak teams. Indeed, [14, Open Problem 2] explicitly asks whether
improved guarantees are possible if instead the teams have a common Bayesian prior about
the possible outcomes of future matches which is bounded away from determinstic.
For example, consider the case where the outcome of all matches are uniformly at random.
Then it is not hard to design a Condorcet-consistent tournament rule which is 2-SNM in
this case. One example is a simple single-elimination bracket: when two manipulating teams
face each other, each of them is equally likely to continue on and win the tournament, so
manipulating doesn’t help.
What if instead the outcome of all matches are not uniformly random, but close? More
specifically, what if the match results are independent, and no team wins any match with
probability more than 1/2 + ε? When ε = 0, the previous paragraph establishes that rules
exist where profitable manipulation is impossible. When ε = 1/2, [14, 15] establish that
2-SNM-1/3 tournaments exist, but no better. What about when ε ∈ (0, 1/2)? How do the
achievable guarantees vary as a function of ε?
Our main result resolves this question, and nails down the guarantees precisely as a
function of ε. Moreover, we show that the same tournament rule achieves the optimal
guarantee for all ε. Below, Randomized Single Elimination Bracket (Definition 12, henceforth
RSEB) randomly seeds all teams, then runs a single-elimination bracket to determine the
winner, and was shown to be 2-SNM-1/3 in [14]. Randomized Death Match (Definition 14,
henceforth RDM) repeatedly picks two uniformly random teams to play a match, and
eliminates the loser (and is first analyzed in this paper).
I Informal Theorem 1 (See Theorems 30, 31). For all ε ∈ [0, 1/2], Randomized Death
Match and Randomized Single Elimination Bracket are 2-SNM-(ε/3 + 2ε2/3) when match
outcomes are independent, and no team wins any match with probability more than 1/2 + ε.
Moreover, for all ε ∈ [0, 1/2], no Condorcet-consistent tournament rule is 2-SNM-α for any
α < ε/3 + 2ε2/3, on the set of all tournaments with independent match outcomes that no
team wins with probability more than 1/2 + ε.
1.2 Technical Highlights
We prove our main result by finding a strong structural similarity between tournaments like
RDM and RSEB: they can be defined recursively. Specifically, RDM could be alternatively
defined as “Pick two teams uniformly at random, and eliminate the loser of their match.
Then, recurse on the remaining teams.” Similarly, RSEB can be alternatively defined as
“Pick a uniformly random perfect matching between the teams, and eliminate all teams which
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lose their match. Then, recurse on the remaining teams.” Even the Randomized King of the
Hill rule (Definition 13, henceforth RKotH) defined by [15] fits this framework as well: “Pick
a uniformly random team to play all other teams. Eliminate all teams who lose a match,
and recurse on the remaining teams.”
In Section 3, we give a formal definition of what it means to be a recursive tournament
rule. And in Section 4 (specifically, Theorem 21), we provide a general framework to analyze
the manipulability of recursive tournament rules on probabilistic tournaments. This provides
a fairly clean outline to analyze recursive tournament rules, and our main result then applies
this framework to RDM and RSEB. In the ε = 1/2 case, our analysis of RSEB in isolation
is perhaps not much simpler than that of [14], but our proof is arguably more structured.
Indeed, a substantial fraction of our proof can be applied verbatim to other tournament rules
like RDM, or applied verbatim to the ε < 1/2 case.
It is worth noting that our framework does face some technical barriers in accommodating
RKotH (and we leave open whether RKotH achieves the same guarantees as RDM and
RSEB). But, the technical barrier is easy to describe: the matches played in each round of
RDM and RSEB form a matching – no team plays more than one match. In RKotH, some
team plays multiple matches. It seems likely that our analysis would extend (perhaps with
messier calculations) to any recursive rule where each round’s matches form a matching.
But we highlight the aspects of our analysis which rely on this aspect of RDM/RSEB (and
therefore don’t hold for RKotH), and believe this is a genuine barrier.
1.3 Further Related Work
We’ve already discussed the most related work [2, 1, 14, 15]. The model is first posed
in [2], and [1] design tournaments which are 2-SNM and approximately Condorcet-consistent
(e.g. pick a uniformly random match and declare the winner of that match to win the
tournament). [14] first proposed to instead consider rules which are Condorcet-consistent
and approximately strategyproof, and establishes that RSEB is 2-SNM-1/3 and that this is
optimal. [15] considers larger manipulating sets (not relevant to this paper) and also designs
RKotH, showing that it too is 2-SNM-1/3 and satisfies a stronger notion of fairness termed
“cover-consistent”. In relation to these works, our main contribution is going beyond the
worst-case to derive improved bounds when match outcomes are more uncertain. A technical
contribution is our framework of recursive tournament rules.
Other recent works within TCS focus specifically on single-elimination brackets and
manipulation in the form of a bracket designer trying to get a certain team to win [18, 17,
9, 8], or manipulability of particular tournament rules such as the World Cup qualifying
procedure [13, 5]. Aside from being thematically related, there is no significant technical
overlap with our work.
1.4 Roadmap
Section 2 immediately follows with definitions and preliminaries. Section 3 provides definitions
concerning recursive tournament rules, and formally defines RDM and RSEB. Section 4
provides our framework for analyzing the manipulability of recursive tournament rules.
Section 5 applies this framework, as a warmup, to rederive the main result of [14] and analyze
RDM/RSEB in the deterministic case. Section 6 proves our main results, and Section 7
provides a brief conclusion.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Tournament Rule Basics
In this section, we introduce notation consistent with prior work [1, 14, 15].
I Definition 2 (Deterministic Tournament). A (round robin) tournament T on n teams is a
complete, directed graph on n vertices whose edges denote the outcome of a match between
two teams. Team i beats team j if the edge between them points from i to j.
I Definition 3 (Tournament Rule). A tournament rule r is a function that maps (determ-
inistic) tournaments T to a distribution over teams, where ri(T ) := Pr[r(T ) = i] denotes
the probability that team i is declared the winner of tournament T under rule r. We use the
shorthand rS(T ) :=
∑
i∈S ri(T ) to denote the probability that a team in S is declared the
winner of tournament T under rule r.
Finally, we are interested in tournament rules which satisfy basic notions of fairness.
Importantly, note that Condorcet-consistence is a minimal notion of fairness, and in particular
does not constrain the behavior of r on any tournament without a Condorcet winner.
I Definition 4 (Condorcet-Consistent). Team i is a Condorcet winner of a tournament T if
i beats every other team (under T ). A tournament rule r is Condorcet-consistent if for every
tournament T with a Condorcet winner i, ri(T ) = 1 (whenever T has a Condorcet winner,
that team wins with probability 1).
2.2 Independent Probabilistic Tournaments
In this work, we study probabilistic tournaments. That is, we are interested in tournaments
where the outcome of each match is not known to teams “in advance”, but teams share a
Bayesian prior about the likelihood of each possible outcome. In particular, we consider
when match outcomes are independent.
I Definition 5 (Independent Probabilistic Tournament). A probabilistic tournament T is just
a distribution over deterministic tournaments. For notational convenience, we slightly abuse
notation and refer by ri(T ) to E[ri(T )] (that is, ri(T ) is the probability that team i wins
when rule r is applied to T , over the randomness in r and the randomness in drawing T ).
A probabilistic tournament T is independent if all match outcomes in T are independent
events. Observe that a probabilistic tournament T is fully defined by probabilities pTij for all
i < j, where pTij denotes the probability that i beats j in tournament T .
Observe that deterministic tournaments are also independent probabilistic tournaments,
with each pTij ∈ {0, 1}. Like prior work, we study tournament rules which are “as strategyproof
as possible”. Because of our focus on independent probabilistic tournaments, we first refine
previous definitions of non-manipulability.
I Definition 6 (S-adjacent). Two independent probabilistic tournaments T, T ′ are S-adjacent
if pTij = pT
′
ij whenever {i, j} 6⊆ S. That is, two independent probabilistic tournaments are
S-adjacent when all (probabilistic) match outcomes are identical, except possibly for matches
between two teams in S.
Intuitively, two tournaments T, T ′ are S-adjacent if the set of teams S can manipulate
the outcomes of matches between them in advance and cause the resulting (probabilistic)
tournament to go from T to T ′.
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I Definition 7 (Manipulating a Tournament). For a set S of teams, independent probabilistic
tournament T , and tournament rule r, we define αrS(T ) to be the maximum winning probability
that S can possibly gain by manipulating T to an S-adjacent T ′. That is: αrS(T ) :=
maxT ′:T ′ is S-adjacent to T {rS(T ′)− rS(T )}.
For a class T of (independent probabilistic) tournaments, we also define αrk(T ) :=
maxT∈T ,S:|S|≤k{αrS(T )}. If αrk(T ) ≤ α, we say r is k-Strongly Non-Manipulable at prob-
ability α with respect to T (k-SNMT -α). To match notation of prior work, we also say a
tournament is k-SNM-α if it is k-SNMS1/2-α.1
Finally, we also define αk(T ) = infCondorcet consistent r{αrk(T )}.
Intuitively, r is k-SNMT -α if no colluding set of ≤ k teams can manipulate a tournament
in T to improve the probability the winner is in S by more than α. The refinement over
prior work is that the condition only holds for tournaments in T – prior work only considers
guarantees that hold over all tournaments. The additional notation in Definition 7 are just
terms that will be helpful for later exposition.
We focus on independent probabilistic tournaments that are close to uniformly random.
I Definition 8 (ε-Bounded Tournaments). An independent probabilistic tournament T is
weakly ε-bounded if for all i, j pTij ∈ [1/2 − ε, 1/2 + ε]. We refer to T ε as the set of all
ε-bounded tournaments.
An independent probabilistic tournament T is strictly ε-bounded if for all i, j pTij ∈
{1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε}. We refer to Sε as the set of all strictly ε-bounded tournaments. It will be
helpful to define the notation T ε≤n (respectively, Sε≤n) as the set of all weakly- (respectively,
strictly-) bounded tournaments on ≤ n teams.
For example, every deterministic tournament is 1/2-bounded, and the uniformly random
tournament is 0-bounded. Our main results study αk(T ε) as a function of ε. We conclude
with a brief lemma relating αk(T ε) to αk(Sε), as direct analysis of αk(Sε) is significantly
simpler than direct analysis of αk(T ε).
I Proposition 9. For all rules r, and all ε, k, αrk(T ε) = αrk(Sε). Therefore, for all ε, k,
αk(T ε) = αk(Sε).
While the proof is deferred to Appendix A, the high-level outline is fairly intuitive.
First, the “Therefore,. . . ” statement follows trivially from the first portion of the lemma.
Also, it is trivial to see that αrk(T ε) ≥ αrk(Sε), as Sε ⊆ T ε. So the interesting step is
establishing αrk(T ε) ≤ αrk(Sε). Intuitively, this follows because all (independent probabilistic)
tournaments in T ε can be written as convex combinations of tournaments in Sε, and one
might expect that any particular tournament rule is most manipulable on extreme points
(indeed this is true). With Proposition 9, we may restrict our study to αk(Sε).
3 Recursive Tournament Rules
In this section, we formalize a class of tournament rules which have a recursive aspect to
them. This will help us streamline previous analysis of [14], and also easily design a new
tournament rule with matching guarantees. In addition, this view will help give us a clean
outline to analyze the performance of these rules on tournaments in T ε, rather than just in
the worst case.
1 Note that S1/2 is the set of all deterministic tournaments, defined shortly below.
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I Definition 10 (Elimination Rule). An elimination rule E takes as input a number n of teams
and selects (possibly randomly) a set M := E(n) of matches to play, with |M | ∈ [1, n− 1].
An elimination rule is matching if M is a (not necessarily perfect) matching with probab-
ility one.
I Definition 11 (Recursive Tournament Rule). A recursive tournament rule is fully defined
by its elimination rule E. The recursive tournament rule rE takes as input a tournament
T , samples matches M := E(n) to play, and then eliminates any team which loses a match
in M .2 Specifically, T |M denotes the induced subgraph of T on teams not eliminated by the
matches in M . The tournament then recursively executes rE(T |M ) to select a winner. As a
base case, when there is only one team left, that team is the winner.
We now give three examples of elimination rules, and the resulting tournament rule.
Randomized Single Elimination Bracket was first studied in [14], Randomized King of the
Hill was first studied in [15], and Randomized Death Match is first studied in this paper.
I Definition 12 (Randomized Single Elimination Bracket). For a tournament T on n teams,
let n′ := 2dlog2 ne. Create n′ − n dummy players who all lose to the original n teams. Let M
be matches corresponding to a uniformly random perfect matching (i.e. exactly n′/2 matches
are played, and every team plays in exactly one match). Eliminate the losers and recurse on
the remaining (non-dummy) teams.
I Definition 13 (Randomized King of the Hill). Pick a uniformly random team i, to play
all others. Observe that if i is a Condorcet winner, then i will be the only remaining team.
Otherwise, i and every team it beats will be eliminated. Recurse on the remaining teams.
I Definition 14 (Randomized Death Match). Pick two uniformly random teams (without
replacement) and play their match. Eliminate the loser and recurse on the remaining teams.
Observe that our definition of Randomized Single Elimination Bracket (RSEB) differs
semantically from that given in [14], where the n′ teams are uniformly permuted into n′
seeds, and then the resulting bracket is played (without re-randomizing at each round).
Observe that the two definitions are equivalent (identically distributed), however, as our
definition simply produces the seeding by first figuring out the first-round matches, then
the second-round matches, etc. Our definition of Randomized King of the Hill (RKotH) is
identical (semantically) to that given in [15].
Randomized Death Match (RDM) is similar to Randomized Voting Caterpillar (RVC) [14].
Like RDM, RVC picks two uniformly random teams (without replacement) and eliminates
the loser. However, rather than a “pure recursion”, RVC proceeds by picking one uniformly
random remaining team to play the previous winner. This subtle distinction causes RDM to
be 2-SNM-1/3 (Theorem 23), but not RVC ([14, Theorem 3.14]). Observe also that RSEB
and RDM have matching elimination rules, but RKotH doesn’t (this is the main technical
barrier in extending our analysis to RKotH).
Finally, observe that all three rules above are anonymous: relabeling the teams simply
relabels the distribution over winners. This will play a role in our analysis.
I Definition 15 (Anonymous). A tournament rule r is anonymous if for every tournament T ,
and every permutation σ, and all i, rσ(i)(σ(T )) = ri(T ).
2 Observe that because |M | ∈ [1, n − 1] that at least one team is eliminated, but not all teams are
eliminated.
K. Ding and S.M. Weinberg 14:7
4 Key Framework
In this section, we propose an outline to analyze the manipulability of recursive tournament
rules for independent probabilistic tournaments. For notational convenience, if a team i is
not present in tournament T (e.g. because they were eliminated in an earlier round), we
abuse notation and denote by ri(T ) := 0. Additionally, we let M(T ) denote the outcome of
matches M for tournament T (i.e. for all (u, v) ∈M , whether u or v wins in tournament T ).
Note that if T is probabilistic, M(T ) is a random variable, even after conditioning on M .
Our first step simply observes that recursive tournament rules can be analyzed recursively
due to linearity of expectation. A (short) proof of Lemma 16 appears in Appendix B.
I Lemma 16. Let rE be any recursive tournament rule. Let T, T ′ be independent probabilistic
tournaments on n > 1 teams, and let S be any subset of teams. Then:
rES (T ′)− rES (T ) = EM←E(n)[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )].
To help parse notation: recall that if T, T ′ are not deterministic, then the notation rES (T ′)
(respectively, rES (T ), rES (T ′|M ), rES (T |M )) is taking an expectation over T ′ (respectively,
T, T ′|M , T |M ), as per Definition 5.3 On the right-hand side, we are taking an expectation
first over the matches M which are played. Inside the expectation, the teams in T |M and
T ′|M are still random variables (because they depend on the outcome of matches in M in T ,
which are still random after conditioning on M). And after the teams are determined by
M(T ),M(T ′), the tournaments T ′|M , T |M are still probabilistic tournaments.
Importantly, observe that when S = {u, v} and T, T ′ are S-adjacent, the tournaments
T |M and T ′|M may differ for two reasons. First, perhaps (u, v) ∈M . In this case, perhaps
M(T ) 6= M(T ′) (because T and T ′ can differ on the (u, v) match), and then T |M , T ′|M may
have different sets of teams. Second, perhaps (u, v) /∈ M , implying that M(T ) = M(T ′)
(because T and T ′ are identically distributed outside of the (u, v) match). T |M and T ′|M
therefore have the same sets of teams, but it can still be that pTuv 6= pT
′
uv, so the tournaments
T |M and T ′|M can still differ due to this match (if both u and v are not eliminated).
The second step in our framework simply splits the recursive analysis into cases based
on M , and the results of the matches M(T ). We define these cases clearly below, and then
state our main framework.
I Definition 17 (Base Case). We say that tournament T is a base case if αrS(T ) = 0. That
is, it is not possible for S to gain by manipulating tournament T under rule r.
One clear base case occurs if S = {u, v}, but u is not even in T . Lemma 22 later identifies
another for anonymous tournament rules (if relabeling u and v doesn’t change T except for
the (u, v) match, then {u, v} cannot gain by manipulating an anonymous tournament rule).
I Definition 18 (Bad Terminal Event). M is a bad terminal event if (u, v) ∈ M . That
is, a bad terminal event occurs when the (u, v) match is played this round. We denote the
occurence of this event by B.
I Definition 19 (Good Terminal Event). M,M(T ) is a good terminal event if (u, v) /∈ M ,
and M(T ) is such that T |M is a base case.4 That is, the (u, v) match is not played now (so
no gains from manipulation are possible), and no future gains are possible either. We denote
the occurence of this event by G.
3 In particular, note that T |M and T ′|M are not independent probabilistic tournaments, but are still
probabilistic tournaments, as they are distributions over independent probabilistic tournaments.
4 Observe that because (u, v) /∈M , that if T ′ is S-adjacent to T then M(T ) and M(T ′) are identically
distributed.
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I Definition 20 (Recursive Event). M,M(T ) is a recursive event if (u, v) /∈M , but M(T ) is
not such that T |M is a base case. That is, a recursive event occurs when the (u, v) match is
not played now, but may be played later (and manipulating it may be beneficial). We denote
the occurence of this event by R.
We now state the theorem which drives our analysis. Observe that the bound claimed by
Theorem 21 could in principle be (very) loose, but our subsequent sections show that this
framework suffices to nail down αr2(T ε) for RDM and RSEB, and also that these are the
best possible guarantees for any Condorcet-consistent tournament rule.
I Theorem 21. Let rE be a recursive tournament rule, ε ∈ [0, 1/2], and S := {u, v}. Let
b, g, c ≥ 0 (with b+ g > 0) be so that for any T ∈ Sε, and any T ′ which is S-adjacent to T :
PrM←E(n)[B] ≤ b.
PrM←E(n),M(T )[G] ≥ g.
EM←E(n)[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|B] ≤ c.
Then: αrE2 (T ε) ≤ bcb+g .
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction, and focus on Sε first (extending to T ε using
Proposition 9). As a base case, observe that when there are at most two teams remaining,
no gains from manipulation are possible and therefore αrE2 (Sε≤2) ≤ 0 ≤ bcb+g as desired.
For the inductive hypothesis, assume that αrE2 (Sε≤n−1) ≤ bcb+g and consider now any
tournament T ∈ Sε on n teams, and an S-adjacent T ′. We have the following chain of
equalities, which essentially just breaks down rES (T ′) − rES (T ) based on the three events
R,B,G (below, I(X) denotes the indicator random variable for event X, which is 1 when
event X occurs and 0 otherwise):
rES (T ′)− rES (T ) = EM←E(n)[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )]
= EM←E(n),M(T )[(rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )) · (I(R) + I(B) + I(G))]
= Pr
M←E(n),M(T )
[R] · EM←E(n),M(T )[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|R]
+ Pr
M←E(n)
[B] · EM←E(n)[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|B]
+ Pr
M←E(n),M(T )
[G] · EM←E(n),M(T )[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|G]
The first line restates Lemma 16. The second line simply observes that exactly one of the
events R,B,G occur, and also uses linearity of expectation to take an expectation also over
M(T ). The third line just observes that E[Y ·I(X)] = Pr[X] ·X[Y |X] for any random variable
Y and event X, breaks the sum into three parts (again using linearity of expectation), and
observes that the event B is determined entirely by M and is independent of M(T ).
We now want to analyze the three terms separately. First, observe that by bullet three:
EM←E(n)[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|B] ≤ c. (1)
Next, observe that in either a good terminal event or a recursive event, (u, v) /∈ M .
Because T, T ′ are S-adjacent, this means that M(T ),M(T ′) are identically distributed (and
can therefore be coupled so that M(T ) = M(T ′) with probability one), so the teams in
T |M and T ′|M are therefore the same. Finally, because T is an independent probabilistic
tournament, and at least one team that participates in every match in M is eliminated,
p
T |M




ij ). This means
that T |M ∈ Sε≤n−1, and also that T ′|M , T |M are S-adjacent.
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In a good terminal event, because αrE2 (T |M ) = 0 by definition, we must therefore have:
EM←E(n),M(T )[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|G] ≤ 0. (2)
In a recursive event, we instead have:
EM←E(n),M(T )[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|R] ≤ αr
E
2 (S≤n−1). (3)
Finally, we may now use our inductive hypothesis and Equations (1), (2), (3) to conclude:
rES (T ′)− rES (T ) = Pr
M←E(n),M(T )
[R] · EM←E(n),M(T )[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|R]
+ Pr
M←E(n)
[B] · EM←E(n)[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|B]
+ Pr
M←E(n),M(T )




b+ g + PrM←E(n)

















≤ (1− b− g) · bc
b+ g + b · c+ g · 0 =
bc
b+ g
The first inequality just combines the work of Equations (1), (2), (3), and upper bounds the
expected gains in all three cases using either the inductive hypothesis (R), direct hypothesis
(B), or definition of good terminal event (G). The final inequality observes that c ≥ bcb+g ≥ 0,
so the bound is maximized when B occurs as often as possible, while G occurs as little as
possible (consistent with the hypotheses).
We have now shown that for any T ∈ Sε, and any T ′ which is S-adjacent, that rES (T ′)−
rES (T ) ≤ bcb+g . This establishes that α
rE
2 (Sε) ≤ bcb+g . Proposition 9 extends this to T
ε. J
Theorem 21 is our main framework for analysis. The remainder of this paper now computes
the bounds required for the three bullets for the two tournament rules of interest as a
function of ε, and substitutes to obtain tight bounds. Finally, it is worth briefly noting that
the definition of αr2(T ε) semantically assumes that teams must decide how to manipulate
the outcome of their match in advance, before any matches are played. Still, any analysis
that follows from Theorem 21 applies even to manipulations which are decided upon as the
match is played. This is because the bound in bullet three of Theorem 21 must hold over all
S-adjacent T ′, not just one which was decided in advance. This claim is not central to our
main results, and making it formal would be notationally cumbersome, so we provide only
this brief discussion.
5 Warmup: Rederiving Bounds for Deterministic Tournaments
In this section, we rederive the main result of [14] (RSEB is 2-SNM-1/3), and analyze a novel
tournament rule (RDM is 2-SNM-1/3) using a simple application of Theorem 21. This will
require one further lemma about anonymous tournament rules to find additional base cases.
The proof is in Appendix C.
I Lemma 22. Let r be any anonymous tournament rule, S := {u, v}, and T, T ′ be independ-
ent probabilistic tournaments which are S-adjacent and satisfy pTuw = pTvw for all w /∈ {u, v}.
Then rS(T ) = rS(T ′).
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We now prove that RDM is 2-SNM-1/3. Recall that α2(S1/2) = 1/3, so this is optimal.
I Theorem 23. RDM is 2-SNM-1/3. Or in our language, αRDM2 (T 1/2) = 1/3.
Proof. Recall that we need to lower bound the probability of a good terminal event, upper
bound the probability of a bad terminal event, and upper bound the gains from manipulation
in case of a bad terminal event. For the deterministic case, the latter bound is particularly
simple, and we will just observe that clearly EM←E(n)[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|B] ≤ 1. This is
simply because the maximum probability that any coalition can win in any tournament is 1,
and the minimum is 0. So we have established that RDM satisfies c = 1.
To bound the probability of a bad terminal event, observe that a bad terminal event

















. First, observe that once we




To see this bound, let `u denote the number of teams which beat u but not v, and `v
denote the number of teams which beat v but not u. Without loss of generality let `u ≥ `v.
If `u + `v = 0, then Lemma 22 already establishes that u and v can gain nothing by
manipulating. If `u + `v ≥ 2, then whenever u or v play a team which beat them, we have a
good terminal event (because u or v is already eliminated before having ever played the (u, v)






If `u + `v = 1, then `u = 1, `v = 0. Let w be the unique team which beats u but not v.
We claim that if w plays either u or v that we are in a good terminal event. Indeed, if w
plays u, then u is eliminated having never played the (u, v) match. If instead w plays v, then
w is eliminated, but now there are no remaining teams which beat u but not v (or vice versa)
and Lemma 22 asserts that there are no further gains from manipulation. The probability











in all cases. Plugging into
Theorem 21 as described above completes the proof. J
The analysis of RSEB is extremely similar to RDM, and requires only slightly more
calculations to bound the probability of a good terminal event. This proof structure is fairly
different than the original analysis in [14], and highlights the similarities to other recursive
tournament rules. A complete proof of Theorem 24 appears in Appendix C.
I Theorem 24 ([14]). RSEB is 2-SNM-1/3. Or in our language, αRSEB2 (T 1/2) = 1/3.
We wrap up our warmup by highlighting key points of the analysis which will be relevant
for our main results. First, observe that our analysis of both rules succeeded by simply
upper-bounding c by 1. Improving this as a function of ε is the biggest technical difference
between our warmup and main results. Second, observe that our analysis required Lemma 22
in case `u < 2. In particular, we needed good terminal events even when both u and v were
not eliminated (and this need continues in main results).
6 Optimal Bounds for Independent Probabilistic Tournaments
Before analyzing our two tournament rules, we extend the simple 3-team lower bound of [14]
for α2(T 1/2) to α2(T ε). The proof is in Appendix D.
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6.1 Gauntlets: Upper Bounding Gains from Bad Terminal Events
As previously noted, the main difference between our warmup and main results is bounding
gain from bad terminal events. We provide a short, but key, structural insight about recursive
tournament rules. Intuitively, a team u wins under rule rE as long as they survive all
elimination matches. Our key observation is that this defines a gauntlet of teams such that u
wins if and only if they defeat every team in the gauntlet.
I Definition 26 (Gauntlet). For deterministic tournament T , recursive tournament rule r,
and team u, let T ′ be such that the outcome of the (v, w) match is the same for all v, w 6= u,
but u is a Condorcet winner. The gauntlet for u in tournament T under recursive rule r,
Gru(T ), is the set of teams that u plays in elimination matches when r is executed on T ′. If
r is randomized, then Gru(T ) is a random variable.
If T is a probabilistic tournament, we extend the notation Gru(T ) to be the random variable
which first samples T , then outputs Gru(T ) (again over randomness in r).
For intuition, consider RSEB. u wins RSEB if and only if they win each of their dlog2(n)e
matches, so their gauntlet is a list of dlog2(n)e teams, one per round. For RDM, however,
the set of matches that u plays is itself a random variable (depending on how many times u
is selected to play), but u still must win all these matches in order to win. For RKotH, the
size of the gauntlet is a random variable as well. Importantly, however, observe that for all
three rules (and any elimination rule), as soon as u loses a match, they are eliminated, so
their gauntlet opponents can be set assuming that u won all previous matches.
Importantly, observe that u’s gauntlet does not depend on the outcome of any of its own
matches (because T ′ immediately causes u to win all its matches anyway). This lets us make
the following key observation, which requires E to be a matching elimination rule.
I Lemma 27. Let rE be an anonymous recursive tournament rule with a matching elimination
rule, T be an independent probabilistic tournament on n teams, M ← E(n), and u, v be two
teams. Let also (u, v) ∈M and w denote the winner of the (u, v) match. Then the random
variable GrEw (T |M ) is independent of w.
Proof. Observe first that because M is a matching which contains (u, v), that exactly one
of {u, v} (namely, w) is present in T |M . Moreover, because T is independent probabilistic,
the remaining teams in T |M are independent of w. Because the definition of w’s gauntlet
immediately considers a tournament T ′ which replaces the outcome of all matches involving
w by having w be a Condorcet winner, the tournament T ′ is independent of w except for
whether w is labeled as “u” or “v”. But because rE(·) is anonymous, its behavior on T ′ is
independent of w’s label. This completes the proof. J
Note that Lemma 27 fails when M is not a matching. This is because: (a) perhaps both
u and v are eliminated, and w is undefined, but also (b) even conditioned on w being defined,
the set of teams in T |M can depend on w. This is the main technical challenge in extending
beyond matching elimination rules.5
5 For example, in RKotH: conditioned on w := u, we know either that u was a Condorcet winner, or that
v was selected to play everyone, so all teams which lose to v are eliminated. If instead w := u, we know
either that v was a Condorcet winner, or that u was selected to play everyone. The teams which lose to
u vs. v could be different, so the Lemma fails to hold.
ITCS 2021
14:12 Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules in the Probabilistic Setting
I Corollary 28. Let rE be an anonymous tournament rule with a matching elimination rule,
T ∈ T ε, S = {u, v} be any two teams, and T ′ be S-adjacent to T . Then:
EM←E(n)[rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M )|B] ≤ 2ε( 12 + ε).
Proof. Because we are in a bad terminal event, this means that (u, v) ∈ M . If we let w
denote the winner of the (u, v) match in T , and w′ denote the winner in T ′, then we know
that GrEw (T |M ) and Gr
E
w′ (T ′|M ) are identically distributed by Lemma 27. This means that:
rES (T |M ) = EGrEw (T |M )
 ∏
x∈GrEw (T |M )
pTwx











 = EGrEw (T |M )
 ∏
x∈GrEw (T |M )
pTw′x

⇒ rES (T ′|M )− rES (T |M ) = EGrEw (T |M )
 ∏
x∈GrEw (T |M )
pTw′x −
∏






w (T |M )
 ∏
x∈GrEw (T |M )
( 12 + ε)−
∏
x∈GrEw (T |M )





w (T |M )
[
( 12 + ε)
|Gr
E
w (T |M )| − ( 12 − ε)
|Gr
E
w (T |M )|
]
≤ 2ε
The first two lines follow by definition of the gauntlet, and Lemma 27. The third line is
basic algebra. The fourth line follows as T ∈ T ε. The fifth line is again basic algebra, and
the final line invokes Lemma 29, which is stated below (proof omitted from this version).
The above calculations hold for any T |M , T ′|M .
I Lemma 29. For all n ∈ N≥0, and ε ∈ [0, 1/2]: ( 12 + ε)
i − ( 12 − ε)
n ≤ 2ε.
To see where the additional factor of ( 12 +ε) comes from, recall that p
T
uv ∈ [1/2−ε, 1/2+ε].
Therefore, pT ′uv − pTuv ≤ 12 + ε. Consider now coupling the tournaments T and T
′ so the the
result of every match except for the one between u and v is identical (this is possible because
T and T ′ are independent probabilistic). Under this coupling, T and T ′ are identical with
probability at least 12 −ε (and gains from manipulation are clearly only possible when T 6= T
′,
which occurs with probability at most 12 + ε, and independently of M). Therefore, T 6= T
′
with probability at most ( 12 + ε) and conditioned on this, r
E
S (T ′|M )− rES (T |M ) ≤ 2ε. J
6.2 RDM and RSEB
Corollary 28 is the main technical lemma to extend from T 1/2 to T ε. We begin with RDM.




Proof. Let T ∈ Sε. Recall that we need to lower bound the probability of a good terminal
event, upper bound the probability of a bad terminal event, and upper bound the gains from
manipulation in case of a bad terminal event. We have already upper bounded the gains
from a bad terminal event using Corollary 28 and can therefore take c = 2ε( 12 + ε).
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To bound the probability of a bad terminal event, observe that a bad terminal event

















. First, observe that once we







To see this bound, let `u denote the number of teams which beat u with probability
(1/2 + ε) but v with probability (1/2− ε), and `v denote the number of teams which beat v
with probabiltiy (1/2 + ε) but u with probability (1/2− ε). Without loss of generality let
`u ≥ `v.
If `u = 0, then Lemma 22 already establishes that u and v can gain nothing by ma-
nipulating. If `u + `v ≥ 2, then whenever u or v plays a team (not in {u, v}) which beats
them, we have a good terminal event (because u or v is already eliminated before having
ever played the (u, v) match, so manipulating the match has no impact). Observe that any
team which beats u (respectively, v) with probability (1/2 + ε) beats v (respectively, u) with
probability at least (1/2− ε). Therefore, we have a good terminal event with probability at
















If `u = 1, `v = 0, then let w be the unique team which beats u with probability (1/2 + ε)
but v with probability (1/2− ε). We claim that if w plays either u or v that we have a good
terminal event. Indeed, if w wins, then either u or v are eliminated having never played the
(u, v) match. If instead w loses this match, then w is eliminated, but now pTux = pTvx for all
remaining teams x, and Lemma 22 asserts that there are no further gains from manipulation.











in all cases. Plugging into
Theorem 21 as described above completes the proof. J
The analysis for RSEB is again similar to RDM, but some calculations are more involved.




Proof. Let T ∈ Sε. We have already upper bounded the gains from a bad terminal event
using Corollary 28 and can therefore take c = 2ε( 12 + ε).
To bound the probability of a bad terminal event, observe that a bad terminal event
occurs only when u plays v this round, which happens with probability exactly 1/(n′ − 1).7.
So RSEB satisfies b = 1/(n′ − 1).
For the good terminal events, we claim that Pr[G] ≥ 2/(n′ − 1). First, observe that once









To see this bound (which requires more calculations than previous proofs), let `u denote
the number of teams which beat u with probability (1/2 + ε) but v with probability (1/2− ε),
and `v denote the number of teams which beat v with probabiltiy (1/2 + ε) but u with
probability (1/2− ε). Without loss of generality let `u ≥ `v.
Case One: `u + `v ≤ 1. If `u = 0, then Lemma 22 already establishes that u and v can
gain nothing by manipulating. If `u = 1, `v = 0, then let w be the unique team which
beats u with probability (1/2 + ε) but v with probability (1/2− ε). We claim that if w






of a good terminal event, as long as w beats either u or v with probability (1/2 + ε). Because there are
two such teams, we get this twice.
7 Recall in RSEB that n′ denotes the total number of teams plus dummy teams, and is 2dlog2(n)e
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plays either u or v that we are in a good terminal event. Indeed, if w wins this match,
then either u or v are eliminated having never played the (u, v) match. If instead w
loses this match, then w is eliminated, but now pTux = pTvx for all remaining teams x, and
Lemma 22 asserts that there are no further gains from manipulation. The probability
that w plays u or v is 2/(n′ − 1), as desired.
Case Two: `u + `v = 2. Next, consider the case where `u+`v = 2, and call the two relevant
teams x,w. Observe first that if u plays x and v plays w, or if u plays w and v plays
x, then we are surely in a good terminal event. This is because either (a) u or v is
eliminated without having played the (u, v) match, or (b) both x and w are eliminated
(allowing us to invoke Lemma 22). This occurs with probability 2(n′−1)(n′−3) . There are
also the cases where exactly one of {w, x} plays a team in {u, v}. For any given pair (a, b),




these cases contribute at least a (1/2 + ε) probability of eliminating the team in {u, v},
and the other two contribute at least a (1/2− ε) probability. So in total, all four cases
contribute at least 2(n
′−4)
(n′−1)(n′−3) , and together we get that a good terminal event occurs
with probability at least:
2
(n′ − 1)(n′ − 3) +
2(n′ − 4)
(n′ − 1)(n′ − 3) =
2(n′ − 3)
(n′ − 1)(n′ − 3) =
2
n′ − 1 .
Case Three: `u + `v ≥ 3. Next, consider the case where `u + `v ≥ 3 (observe that this
implies n ≥ 5). We will show that either u or v are eliminated with probability at
least 2/(n′ − 1). Indeed, let Lu denote the set of teams which beat u with probability
(1/2 + ε) (but not v), and Lv denote the set of teams which beat v with probability
(1/2 + ε) (but not u). Then consider the case where u plays a team in Lu, or v plays
a team in Lv. Conditioned on this, both u and v survive with probability at most
(1/2 + ε)(1/2 − ε) ≤ 1/4, so one of {u, v} is eliminated with probability at least 3/4.
So one sufficient condition would be to establish that u plays a team in Lu or v plays
a team in Lv with probability at least 8/3n′−1 (because conditioned on this, one of {u, v}
is eliminated with probability 3/4, for a total probability of at least 2n′−1 that one of
{u, v} is eliminated). In the subcase that `u ≥ 3, then the probability is in fact at least
3/(n′ − 1), as desired. Clearly, this probability is monotone in `u, `v, so this leaves the
only remaining subcase as `u = 2, `v = 1.
Subcase Three-A: `u = 2, `v = 1, n ≥ 9. For the subcase of `u = 2, `v = 1, the probabil-
ity that u plays a team in Lu or v plays a team in Lv is 2n′−1 +
(n′−5)
(n′−1)(n′−3) .
9 As n′ ≥ 16







n′−1 , which resolves this case by the work above.
Subcase Three-B: `u = 2, `v = 1, ε ≥ 12√13 , n ∈ [5, 8]. When n ∈ [5, 8], we have n
′ = 8.





Unfortunately, this is < 8/3n′−1 , meaning that this case doesn’t immediately resolve by the
method above. In this range, we do an explicit case analysis. First, observe that u and v
are least likely to be eliminated when there are more dummy teams (because u and v
8 Because the probability that a plays b is 1/(n′ − 1), and the probability that the other two teams do
not play, conditioned on this, is (n′ − 4)/(n′ − 3).
9 To see this, observe that the probability that u plays a team in Lu is 2/(n′ − 1). The probability that
u plays a team not in Lu ∪ Lv ∪ {v} is (n′ − 5)/(n′ − 1). Conditioned on this, the probability that v
plays the team in Lv is 1/(n′ − 3) (and this is the only way that v can possibly play the team in Lv
without u playing Lu).
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beat dummy teams with probability one, but real teams with probably at most 1/2 + ε).
So the worst case to consider is when n = 5: two real teams beat only u, one beats only
v, and there are three dummy teams. We just have to compute several cases:
Perhaps u plays one of the `u teams, and v plays one of the `v teams. This occurs with
probability 27 ·
1
5 , and eliminates u or v with probability 1− (1/2− ε)
2 = 3/4 + ε− ε2.




5 , and eliminates u or v with probability 1− (1/2 + ε)(1/2− ε) = 3/4 + ε
2.
Perhaps u plays one of the `u teams, and v plays a dummy team. This occurs with
probability 27 ·
3
5 , and eliminutes u with probability 1/2 + ε.
Perhaps u plays one of the `v teams, and v plays one of the `u teams. This occurs with
probability 17 ·
2
5 , and eliminates u or v with probability 1− (1/2 + ε)
2 = 3/4− ε− ε2.
Perhaps u plays one of the `v teams, and v plays a dummy team. This occurs with
probability 17 ·
3
5 , and eliminates u with probability 1/2− ε.
Perhaps u plays a dummy team, and v plays one of the `v teams. This occurs with
probability 37 ·
1
5 , and eliminates v with probability 1/2 + ε.
Perhaps u plays a dummy team, and v plays one of the `u teams. This occurs with
probability 37 ·
2
5 , and eliminates v with probability 1/2− ε.




So either u or v is eliminated (without playing each other) with probability:
2
35 · (3/4 + ε− ε
2) + 235 · (3/4 + ε
2) + 635 · (1/2 + ε) +
2
35 · (3/4− ε− ε
2)
+ 335 · (1/2− ε) +
3
35 · (1/2 + ε) +
6




2 ≥ 2670 > 2/7.
Note that when n ∈ [5, 8], the probability of a bad event is exactly 1/7, and the above
work establishes that in case Three-B, the probability of a good terminal event is at least
twice that of a bad terminal event.
The arguments above handle all possible cases, and establishes that g ≥ 2/(n′ − 1) in all
cases. Plugging into Theorem 21 as described above completes the proof. J
7 Conclusion and Open Problems
We take a beyond worst-case view on manipulability of tournament rules, and nail down
optimal guarantees as a function of the uncertainty of match outcomes. Specifically, our
main result shows that α2(T ε) = ε/3 + 2ε2/3, and this is achieved for all ε by Randomized
Death Match and Randomized Single Elimination Bracket. Our main technical contribution
is a framework to analyze recursive tournament rules.
There are two natural directions for future work. The first concerns further work in the
probabilistic setting: does αRKotH2 (T ε) = ε/3+2ε2/3? The main technical barrier is replacing
Lemma 27, which only holds for matching elimination rules.10 In addition, it is interesting
to analyze probabilistic tournaments which are not independent. Here there are technical
barriers to overcome (many of our steps do require independence), but also conceptual
10There are other barriers to using our precise definitions, but these barriers seem semantic rather than
substantial.
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ones: if tournament match outcomes are correlated, should we consider manipulations which
are correlated with external outcomes as well? If so, is there a natural way to consider
manipulations which are “not more correlated than the original tournament itself”?
A second direction concerns applications of our recursive framework towards other
problems in approximately strategy-proof tournament design. For example, it is still an open
question following [15] what is αk(T 1/2) for any k > 2. Our recursive framework may prove
useful for analyzing this, or at least determining achievable guarantees for recursive rules.
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A Omitted Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Proposition 9. The second statement of the lemma clearly follows from the first. It
is trivial to see that αrk(T ε) ≥ αrk(Sε), as Sε ⊆ T ε. To get intuition for why αrk(T ) ≤ αrk(Sε),
observe that every probabilistic tournament in T ε can be written as a convex combination of
probabilistic tournaments in Sε. Indeed, this intuition drives the proof.
To see this formally, let T be an arbitrary (independent probabilistic) tournament in T ε,
and let T ′ be any S-adjacent (independent probabilistic) tournament for some |S| ≤ k. Then
pTij ∈ [1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε] for all i, j, by definition. Consider the following procedure to jointly
sample tournaments from T, T ′. The procedure first constructs another pair of probabilistic
tournaments U,U ′, and then samples from these.
1. For all (i, j), set qij :=
pTij−(1/2−ε)
2ε . Observe that qij · (1/2 + ε) + (1− qij) · (1/2− ε) = p
T
ij ,
and that qij ∈ [0, 1] as pTij ∈ [1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε].
2. For each (i, j), independently, set pij equal to (1/2 + ε) with probability qij and equal to
(1/2− ε) with probability (1− qij).
3. For all (i, j), set pUij := pij .
4. For all (i, j) such that {i, j} 6⊆ S, set pU ′ := pU . For other (i, j), set pU ′ij := pT
′
ij .
5. Draw a pair of tournaments according to U,U ′ (independently, say).
Observe that this procedure correctly draws two tournament according to T, T ′. Indeed,
it is easy to see for each output tournament that the outcome of each match is independent,
simply because they are independent in U (resp. U ′), and because the random variables pUij
(resp. pU ′ij ) are independent. Moreover, we claim that the probability that i beats j is exactly
pTij . Indeed, the probability that i beats j in U is: E[pUij ] = qij ·(1/2+ε)+(1−qij) ·(1/2−ε) =
pTij . In U ′, when {i, j} ⊆ S, the probability that i beats j in U ′ is clearly pT
′
ij by definition.
When {i, j} 6⊆ S, the probability that i beats j is also pTij , which is equal to pT
′
ij as T, T ′ are
S-adjacent. Additionally, observe that: (a) U ∈ Sε and (b) U and U ′ are S-adjacent. Now,
consider any tournament rule r(·):
For all i: ri(T ) = E[ri(U)], and ri(T ′) = E[ri(U ′)]
⇒ rS(T ′)− rS(T ) = E[rS(U ′)− rS(U)] ≤ αrk(Sε)
Indeed, the first line is simply linearity of expectation, once the previous work confirms that
going through U,U ′ is a valid way to draw tournaments from T, T ′. The third line then also
follows by linearity of expectation. The final line follows as U ∈ Sε, and U,U ′ are S-adjacent.
This completes the proof, as we have now shown that αrk(T ε) ≤ αrk(Sε). J
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B Omitted Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 16. This follows immediately from linearity of expectation. For all i, the
probability that i wins in tournament T under rule rE(·) is the expected probability that i
wins in T |M . Summing over i ∈ S, and repeating this for T ′ yields the lemma. J
C Omitted Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Lemma 22. Let σ(·) denote the permutation which swaps u and v. Consider any
two deterministic tournaments U, σ(U). Then because r(·) is anonymous, we have:
ru(U) + rv(U) = rσ(u)(σ(U)) + rσ(v)(σ(U)) = rv(σ(U)) + ru(σ(U))
⇒ rS(U) = rS(σ(U))
Indeed, the first line simply applies anonymity, and the second line simply applies σ. Now let’s
return to T, T ′ (which are independent probabilistic tournaments, rather than deterministic).
Consider the following process to draw T and T ′ jointly:
1. To emphasize that pTuw = pTvw, for all w /∈ {u, v}, denote by pTw := pTuw.
2. Without loss of generality, let pTuv ≤ pT
′
uv.
3. Draw the outcome of all matches involving two teams both /∈ {u, v}. Set the outcome of
these matches the same for T and T ′.
4. For all w /∈ {u, v}, draw qw1 and qw2 iid and uniformly from [0, 1]. Draw quv independently
and uniformly from [0, 1].
5. For all w /∈ {u, v}, have u beat w if and only if qw1 < pTw. Have v beat w if and only if
qw2 < p
T
w. Have u beat v if and only if quv < pTuv.
6. If quv /∈ [pTuv, pT
′
uv], set T ′ := T .
7. If quv ∈ [pTuv, pT
′
uv], then set T ′ := σ(T ).
This process clearly satisfies that with probability one, either T ′ = T or T ′ = σ(T ). By
the work above, this means that rS(T ) = rS(T ′) as desired, as long as we confirm that this
process validly samples both T and T ′. It is easy to see that the process is valid for T : the
match outcomes are clearly independent, and any team w beats x if and only if a uniformly
random draw from [0, 1] is < pTwx (which happens with probability pTwx, as desired).
To see that the process is valid for T ′, observe first that u beats v with probability exactly
pT
′
uv, because u beats v whenever quv < pT
′
uv. Moreover, after conditioning on quv, the outcome
of each (u,w) match is either set according to qw1 (an independent, uniform draw from [0, 1]),
or qw2 (also an independent, uniform draw from [0, 1]). In either case, these match results
are all set independently and with the correct probability (because T, T ′ are S-adjacent, and
because qw1, qw2 are iid because pTuw = pTvw for all w). This completes the proof. J
Proof of Theorem 24. We again simply let c = 1 and take the trivial bound on the gain in
bad terminal events.
To bound the probability of a bad terminal event, observe that a bad terminal event
occurs only when u plays v this round, which happens with probability exactly 1/(n′ − 1).11
So RSEB satisfies b = 1/(n′ − 1).
For the good terminal events, we claim that Pr[G] ≥ 2/(n′−1). First, observe that once we
show this, we can plug into Theorem 21 and conclude αRSEB2 (T 1/2) ≤
1·1/(n′−1)
1/(n′−1)+2/(n′−1) = 1/3.
11Recall that in RSEB, n′ := 2dlog2(n)e.
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To establish this bound, let `u denote the number of teams which beat u but not v, `v
denote the number of teams which beat v but not u. Without loss of generality let `u ≥ `v.
If `u + `v = 0, then Lemma 22 already establishes that u and v gain nothing by
manipulating. If `u ≥ 2, then whenever u plays a team which beats them, we have a good
terminal event (because u is already eliminated before having ever played the (u, v) match,
so manipulating the match has no impact). This happens with probability at least 2/(n′− 1).
If `u = 1, `v = 0, then let w denote the unique team which beats u but not v. We now
claim that if w plays either u or v that we are in a good terminal event. Indeed, if w plays
u, then u is eliminated having never played the (u, v) match. If instead w plays v, then w is
eliminated, but now there are no remaining teams which beat u but not v (or vice versa)
and Lemma 22 asserts that there are no further gains from manipulation. The probability
that w plays u or v is 2/(n′ − 1), as desired.
Finally, if `u = `v = 1, let w denote the unique team which beats u but not v, and x
denote the unique team which beats v but not u (this case requires slightly more calculations
than RDM). If u plays w, or v plays x, then at least one of u, v is eliminated before the
(u, v) match is played, and therefore no gains are possible. This happens with probability
2/(n′ − 1) − 1(n′−1)(n′−3) . In addition, if u plays x and v plays w, then both x and w will
be eliminated, and Lemma 22 asserts that there are no further gains from manipulation.
This occurs with probability 1(n′−1)(n′−3) . Therefore, a good terminal event happens with
probability at least 2/(n′−1), as desired. This handles all possible cases, and establishes that
g ≥ 2/(n′ − 1) in all cases. Plugging into Theorem 21 as described completes the proof. J
D Omitted Proofs from Section 6
Proof of Lemma 25. Consider a 3-player tournament T with teams u, v, and w, pTuv =
pTvw = pTwu = 12 + ε.
12 Noting that T is randomized, there are two possible types of
deterministic outcomes: outcomes where there is a Condorcet winner, and outcomes which
form a cycle (either v beats u, u beats w, and w beats v, or vice versa).
In T , each of the three players has probability ( 12 + ε)(
1
2 − ε) of being a Condorcet winner.
Call the cycle where v beats u “cycle 1”; this occurs with probability ( 12 + ε)
3. Call the
opposing cycle (where u beats v) “cycle 2”; this occurs with probability ( 12 − ε)
3.
Let r be any Condorcet-consistent tournament rule. Denote by γx the probability that
the rule selects x as the winner when cycle 1 occurs (for any x ∈ {u, v, w}). Denote by βx
the probability that the rule selects x as the winner when cycle 2 occurs. Recall that r must
select x as the winner with probability 1 when x is the Condorcet winner.
Suppose that u and v collude so that u throws their match to v. Specifically, let Tuv
denote the {u, v}-adjacent tournament to T where pTuvuv = 0 (instead of 1/2 + ε). In Tuv, v
is a Condorcet winner with probability 12 + ε (they need only beat w), cycle 2 occurs with
probability ( 12 − ε)
2 (v must lose to w, who must lose to u), and w is a Condorcet winner
with probability ( 12 + ε)(
1
2 − ε). No other outcomes are possible. We then have:




− 2( 12 + ε)(
1
2 − ε)− (βu + βv) · (
1
2 − ε)
3 − (γu + γv)( 12 + ε)
3
= 2ε · ( 12 + ε) + (βu + βv) · ((
1
2 − ε)
2 − ( 12 − ε)
3)− (γu + γv)( 12 + ε)
3
12That is, if ε = 1/2, this is the same 3-cycle example from [14].
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Identical calculations hold for T vw, Twu. We can sum these three together to achieve:
(ru(Tuv) + rv(Tuv)− ru(T )− rv(T )) + (rv(T vw) + rw(T vw)− rv(T )− rw(T ))
+ (rw(Twu) + ru(Twu)− rw(T )− ru(T ))
= 6ε · ( 12 + ε) + 2(βu + βv + βw) · ((
1
2 − ε)
2 − ( 12 − ε)
3)− 2(γu + γv + γw)( 12 + ε)
3
= 6ε · ( 12 + ε) + 2 · (
1
2 − ε)




= 6ε · ( 12 + ε) + 2 · (
1
2 + ε) · ((
1
2 − ε)
2 − ( 12 + ε)
2)
= 6ε · ( 12 + ε) + 2 · (
1
2 + ε) · (−2ε) = 2ε · (
1
2 + ε)
This means that one of the three coalitions can gain at least 23ε(
1
2 + ε) =
1
3ε+
2
3ε
2. J
